15th Battalion - 9/10 May 1915

Report on sortie made from Monash Gully by a portion of the 4 Australian Infantry Brigade on the nights 9/10 May 1915.

On the 9 May, Major General Sir A J Godley came to N.Z & A Divisions issued instructions to officers commanding Sections of Defence to arrange for minor offensive operations from Hill Sections, with a view to testing the enemy’s strength.

In accordance with the above direct Colonel J. H. Cannan 15th Batt Australian Infantry issued orders for an offensive movement from Quinn’s Post in No 3 Section to be made on the night 9/10 May.

The object in view was the occupation of certain Turkish trenches situated in front of Quinn’s Post at a distance of from 25 – 100 yards.

The Troops at direct Colonel ………’s disposal were

            15 Regt Aust Inf                     400

            16 Regt Aust Inf                     100

            13 Regt Aust Inf                     100

The troops detailed for the actual assault were directed into these positions:-

Right party                  25 men           15 Batt            Lieut A. P. Armstrong

Centre                         47 men           15 Batt            Lieut Gozedin

Left                              25 men           15 Batt            Lieut Smith

The three parties detailed for the assault were ordered to advance ……. At a preconcerted signal.  Should the Turkish trenches be found suitable for our occupation, word was to be sent back for working parties who were to render the trenches suitable for our use – the assaulting party in the meantime pressing on to further positions from which they could cover the working parties.

At 10.45pm the three assaulting parties issued from the trenches of Quinn’s Post and advanced over the Turkish trenches without suffering any casualties.  The front of the advance was approximately 300 yds. 

(a) The eighth party continued its advance for some 500 yds with a small valley, the head of which was between Courtney’s and Quinn’s Posts.  If accounted for some 80 Turks and pushed a dug-out which continued telephone equipment and was apparently the local headquarters.  Corporal Tickner 15 Regt distinguished himself by moving around this small camp and cutting the telephone wires on the far side of it.  The party then pre-assembled and …… to the trench which was their objective with the loss of 3 men only.

(b) The counter party bayoneted such Turks as were found in the trench assaulted it they remained in the trench and sent back for the working party.  When this arrived there was much congestion in the trench.

(c) The left party met with considerable opposition from the trenches they were attacking, but eventually drove off the enemy.  It found the trenches suitable for our use, but sent for the working party to connect them up with Quinn’s Post.  The party itself remained in the captured trench.

By 12 midnight satisfactory reports had been received from each of the three parties, and all working parties were out at work.  These had been some 12 casualties.  Up to 2am.  There was no further incident and communications trenches leading back to Quinn’s Post were constructed.

About 2am messages were received from the centre and left parties asking for reinforcements.  The centre trench (as previously stated) was much congested and the working party had been gradually absorbed into the firing line.  On response to these requests the following were sent:-

60 men of the 15 and 16 Batt to the centre

100 men of the 15 Batt to the left 

These reinforcements were apparently led directly up to the firing line in the trenches, thus increasing the congestion.  The right party reported all well.

About the same time (2 am) direct …..  Adjutant 15 Batt reported that there was a gap between the centre and left portion of the firing line. The size of this gap was not at the time ……., though patrols were sent out for the purpose from both flanks.  It afterwards appeared that this gap was about 25 yards long, was in possession of the Turks and that into it led a Turkish communications trench leading from the direction of square 224 D5.

The gap and the communications trench were strongly held by the enemy who brought a heavy enfilade fire to bear on the centre and left of our firing line, which was in occupation of the captured trenches.

It was now beginning to get light and Colonel Cannan ordered Captain Townsend, 16 Batt to assault the gap and fill it with 40 men 16 Batt and 30 men 13 Batt.  Soon after that assault …….. from the left of Quinn’s Post two of the officers with it were shot and the assault was not pushed home.  Lieut Marks, 13 Batt, however with a small party of the force pressed on but were repulsed by rifle fire and hand grenades.

At about 4am Captain Stoddart R.M.L.I. reported to Col Cannan with 100 marines.  He was ordered to assault and close the gap.  This assault did not take place.

About 4.30am, the left of the line began to give way and the centre requested permission to fall back as its position was becoming untenable.  Lieut Col Cannan therefore ordered the retirement of the centre and right, then withdrawing the whole force.  The right reported that is was holding its own, but was withdrawn as it could not be properly supported.

At daylight the enemy appeared to have some 1500 troops in front of Quinn’s Post and they attacked it heavily, assisted by a mountain gun and machine guns on both flanks and in the centre – the last names guns being brought along the communications trench to within about 45 yards of Quinn’s Post.

The casualties in this action were:-

Killed 7 officers and 29 other ranks

Wounded and missing 7 officers and 164 other ranks

The enemy’s casualties are estimated at 800, as many were bayoneted and one of our machine guns got into a mass of troops forming up for assault.

AWM http://www.awm.gov.au/cms_images/AWM4/23/AWM4-23-32-7.pdf (source 7)